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We give a (remote) quantum gambling scheme that makes
use of the fact that quantum nonorthogonal states cannot
be distinguished with certainty. In the proposed scheme, two
participants Alice and Bob can be regarded as playing a game
of making guesses on identities of quantum states that are in
one of two given nonorthogonal states: if Bob makes a correct
(an incorrect) guess on the identity of a quantum state that
Alice has sent, he wins (loses). It is shown that the proposed
scheme is secure against the nonentanglement attack. It can
also be shown heuristically that the scheme is secure in the
case of the entanglement attack.
03.67.Dd
A fundamental property of quantum bits (qubits) that
differs from those of classical bits is that unknown qubits
cannot be copied with unit efficiency [1,2] (the no-cloning
theorem). Another related property of qubits is that
nonorthogonal qubits cannot be distinguished with cer-
tainty [3–8]. The no-cloning theorem is the basis for
the success of the Bennett-Brassard 1984 quantum-key-
distribution scheme [9]. Therefore, it is interesting to
search for quantum protocols utilizing the property that
nonorthogonal qubits cannot be distinguished with cer-
tainty. Bennett’s other quantum-key-distribution scheme
[10] indeed utilizes this property. On the other hand, a
(remote) quantum gambling scheme has been found by
Goldenberg et al. recently [11].
In this paper we propose another (remote) quantum
gambling scheme that makes use of the fact that two
nonorthogonal qubits cannot be distinguished with cer-
tainty. In the proposed scheme, two participants Alice
and Bob can be regarded as playing a game of mak-
ing guesses on identities of quantum states that are
in one of two given nonorthogonal states; Alice ran-
domly sends one of two nonorthogonal qubits, say, |0〉
and |0¯〉. [In this paper, |0¯〉 ≡ (1/√2)(|0〉 + |1〉) and
|1¯〉 ≡ (1/√2)(|0〉− |1〉).] If Bob makes a correct guess, he
wins. If not, he loses. Due to the fact that two nonorthog-
onal qubits cannot be distinguished with certainty, it is
easy to see that there is no way for Bob to cheat. Alice
might try to increase her gain by sending some qubits
other than |0〉 and |0¯〉. There are two kinds of attacks.
In nonentanglement attacks, qubits sent to Bob are not
entangled with Alice’s. In entanglement attacks [12,13]
(or EPR attack), qubits sent to Bob are highly entan-
gled with hers. We show that the scheme is secure in
the case of nonentanglement attacks. In the case of en-
tanglement attacks, however, we heuristically show the
security of the scheme. It is true that a quantum cryp-
tographic scheme is of little use without security proof
against all attacks including entanglement attacks. And
what makes it complicated to prove security of a quantum
cryptographic scheme is the entanglement attack [12,13].
Our security proof of the scheme against the entangle-
ment attack is heuristic. However, since the idea behind
the proof is simple, we believe that a rigorous one will be
found, like in the case of the quantum key distributions
[14–17].
The difference between our scheme and the original
one [11] is that the former relies on the fact that two
nonorthogonal states cannot be distinguished with cer-
tainty while the latter relies on gerneral quantum me-
chanical laws.d Another difference is that no quantum
system needs to be additionally sent in checking steps in
our scheme while it needs to be in the original scheme.
Now, let us describe the scheme more precisely.
(1) Alice randomly chooses one between two nonorthog-
onal qubits |0〉 and |0¯〉, and sends it to Bob [18].
(2) On the qubit he receives, Bob performs a measure-
ment by which he can obtain maximal probability p of
correctly guessing the identity of the qubit.
(3) On basis of the measurement’s results, he makes a
guess on which one the qubit is and announces it to Al-
ice.
(4) If he made a correct (an incorrect) guess, Alice an-
nounces he has won (lost).
(5) When Bob has won, Alice gives him one coin. When
he has lost, Bob gives her p/(1− p) coins.
However, after the first step, Bob follows the following
ones instead of steps (2) − (5), at randomly chosen in-
stances with a rate r (0 < r ≪ 1).
(These checking steps are similar to those of the original
work of Goldenberg et al. [11].)
(2′) Bob performs no measurement on the qubit and
stores it.
(3′) He announces his randomly chosen guess on identity
of the qubit.
(4′) Do the same thing as step (4).
(5′) In the previous step, Alice has actually revealed
which one she chose to tell him the qubit is (regardless
of her honesty). When it is |0〉, Bob performs Sˆz (Sˆz
an orthogonal measurement that composes of two pro-
jection operators |0〉〈0| and |1〉〈1| or {|0〉〈0|, |1〉〈1|}.) If
the outcome is |1〉, Bob announces that he performed Sˆz
and got |1〉 as an outcome. Then Alice must give him
R (≫ 1) coins. If the outcome is |0〉, Bob says nothing
about which measurement he performed and follows step
1
(5). In the case of |0¯〉, similar things are done with Sˆx
(= {|0¯〉〈0¯|, |1¯〉〈1¯|}).
In step (2), it is important for Bob to perform the op-
timal measurement that assures maximal probability p
of correctly guessing the identity of the qubit in order to
assure his maximal gain. Although it is known that aver-
age information gain is constrained by the Levitin-Holevo
bound [3,4,19], to find the optimal one is not an easy task.
Fortunately, however, in the case of two nonorthogo-
nal qubits, the measurement giving maximal information
gain is well known [7,8]: a measurement {|0˜〉〈0˜|, |1˜〉〈1˜|},
where |0˜〉 and |1˜〉 are qubits corresponding to a vector
(1/
√
2)(zˆ − xˆ) and (1/√2)(−zˆ + xˆ), respectively, in the
Bloch sphere representation, where a single qubit density
operator ρB = (1/2)(1+rˆ·~σ). Here 1 is the identity oper-
ator, rˆ is a Bloch vector, ~σ = (σx, σy, σz), and σx, σy, σz
are the Pauli operators. (See Fig. 1 of Ref. [7] or Fig.
2 of Ref. [8].) Since information gain is maximal if and
only if p is maximal, a measurement with maximal infor-
mation gain is what maximizes p. Thus the measurement
{|0˜〉〈0˜|, |1˜〉〈1˜|} is the optimal one. For maximal p, Bob
does as the following. When the outcome is |0˜〉 (|1˜〉),
he makes a guess that the qubit is |0〉 (|0¯〉). Then the
probability p of correctly guessing the qubit is given by
p = |〈0˜|0〉|2 = |〈1˜|1〉|2 = cos2(π/8).
Now let us show how each player’s average gain is as-
sured. First it is clear by definition that Bob can do noth-
ing better than performing the optimal measurement, as
long as Alice prepares the specified qubits. In the scheme,
the numbers of coins that Alice and Bob pay are ad-
justed so that no one gains when Bob’s win probability
is p. Thus Bob’s gain GB cannot be greater than zero,
that is, GB ≤ 0. Next let us consider Alice’s strategy. As
noted above, we first show the security against nonentan-
glement attacks. In the most general nonentanglement
attacks, Alice randomly generates each qubit in state |i〉
with a probability pi. Here |i〉’s are arbitrarily specified
states of qubits, i = 1, 2, ..., N and
∑N
i pi = 1. However,
since Bob has no knowledge about which |i〉 Alice se-
lected at each instance, his treatments on qubits become
equal for all qubits. Thus it is sufficient to show the se-
curity for a qubit in an arbitrary state |j〉 = a|0〉+ b|1〉.
(a and b are some complex numbers with a constraint
|a|2 + |b|2 = 1.) First we do it for states within the z-
x plane, |j〉 = cos(θ/2)|0〉 + sin(θ/2)|1〉. Later we will
generalize the argument to the former case. Let us con-
sider the following. In steps (2′) − (5′), Bob checks at
randomly chosen instances whether Alice has really sent
|0〉 or |0¯〉 by performing measurements Sˆz or Sˆz, respec-
tively. If the measurement’s outcomes are |0〉 or |0¯〉 (|1〉
or |1¯〉), Alice has passed (not passed) the test. When not
passed, Alice must give him R(≫ 1) coins [20].
Roughly speaking, Alice can do nothing but preparing
either |0〉 or |0¯〉 and honestly tell the identity of the state
to him later. Otherwise she sometimes must pay R coins
to him, decreasing her gain. Let us consider this point
more precisely. First we estimate the upper bound of
Alice’s gain GA. It is clear that
GA ≤ max{G0A, G0¯A}, (1)
where max{x, y} denotes the maximal one between x and
y, and G0A (G
0¯
A) is Alice’s gain when she insists that |j〉
is |0〉 (|0¯〉). When he has performed the measurements
already, he has no way of detecting Alice’s cheating. So,
Alice’s maximal gain in this case is p/(1− p). However,
it is clear that GA is bounded by p/(1 − p) in any case.
When he has preserved the qubits following the check-
ing steps, Alice’s cheating can be statistically detected.
This case contributes to Alice’s gain by a largely nega-
tive term whose modulus is proportional to the product
of the rate r of checking steps, the probability that |1〉 or
|1¯〉 is detected, and the number of coins R she must pay
when it is detected, namely −r|〈1|j〉|2R or −r|〈1¯|j〉|2R.
However, here we should take into account the fact that
Alice obtains partial information about whether Bob has
performed the measurement: let fu be Alice’s estimation
of the probability that Bob did not perform the measure-
ment. With no information, fu is r. However, Bob’s an-
nounced guess gives her partial information on his mea-
surement’s result if he did. This information can be used
to make a better estimate of fu. For example, in the case
where Alice sends |j〉 and Bob performs the optimal mea-
surement {|0˜〉〈0˜|, |1˜〉〈1˜|}, we obtain using the Bayes’s rule
that fu = (r/2)/[(r/2) + (1 − r)|〈0˜|j〉|2] when his guess
is |0〉. However, it is clear that fu ≥ r/2: when Bob
did not perform the measurement, he simply guesses it
with equal probabilities regardless of what he received.
Thus by the Bayes’s rule, Alice can see that there re-
mains a probability greater than r/2 that Bob did not
perform the measurement. The relation fu ≥ r/2 also
holds for the entanglement attacks, since it is satisfied for
any |j〉 as shown above (refer to the related discussion on
entanglement-attack later). Combining above facts, we
obtain
G0A ≤
p
1− p −
r
2
|〈1|j〉|2R (2)
and
G0¯A ≤
p
1− p −
r
2
|〈1¯|j〉|2R. (3)
From Eqs. (1)-(3), we can see, in order that GA be non-
negative the following two conditions must be satisfied.
(1) Either |〈1|j〉|2 ∼ (1/rR) ≪ 1 (that is, |j〉 ∼ |0〉) or
|〈1¯|j〉|2 ∼ (1/rR) ≪ 1 (that is, |j〉 ∼ |0¯〉); (2) Between
|0〉 and |0¯〉, Alice chooses what is nearer to |j〉. Then she
pretends in the step (4)’s that it is the qubit sent to Bob.
Otherwise, GA will be dominated by the negative second
term in the right-hand sides of Eqs. (2) and (3).
Alice might increase her gain by sending a qubit that
slightly differs from either |0〉 or |0¯〉. However, the gain
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can be made negligible by making R large, as we show
in the following. Let us consider the case where Alice
prepares |j〉 (∼ |0〉) and later tells him that it is |0〉, for
example. In this case, GA for a given r and R is given
by
GA = (1− r){|〈0˜|j〉|2(−1) + |〈1˜|j〉|2 p
1− p}
−r|〈1|j〉|2R+ r|〈0|j〉|2{1
2
(−1) + 1
2
p
1− p}
< (1− r){[cos(π
8
+
θ
2
)]2(−1) + [sin(π
8
+
θ
2
)]2
p
1− p}
−r(sin θ
2
)2R+ 3r. (4)
Here the first (second and third) term in the right-hand
sides is due to normal steps (1)−(5) [checking steps (2′)−
(5′)]. We can check Eq. (4) by verifying that GA < 3r ∼
0 when |j〉 equals |0〉. By the two conditions, we might
only consider the case where θ ∼ 0, and thus we can
neglect higher-order terms in Eq. (4),
GA <
α
1− pθ −
rR
4
θ2 + 3r, (5)
where α = cos(π/8) sin(π/8) and a small term of order
θ2 is also neglected. Alice would maximize her gain for
given r and R. Maximal value of GA is obtained when
θ = (2α/[1− p])(1/rR).
GmaxA =
α2
(1− p)2
1
rR
+ 3r. (6)
Bob would minimize GmaxA for a given R. G
max
A has
its minimal value 2
√
3α/[(1 − p)√R] when r = α/[(1 −
p)
√
3R]. Therefore, if Bob chooses r = α/[(1 − p)
√
3R]
then GA is bounded by the positive term 2
√
3α/[(1 −
p)
√
R] ∝ 1/
√
R that approaches to zero as R become
large, similarly to the case of the scheme of Goldenberg
et al. [11].
Now we argue that using a qubit outside the z-x plane
does not increase Alice’s gain: we can see in Eq. (4)
that GA can only be increased by making the ratio
|〈1˜|j〉|2/|〈0˜|j〉|2 large while keeping |〈1|j〉|2 a very small
constant. Let us consider some set of |j〉’s (not confined
in the z-x plane) that give the same value of |〈1|j〉|2.
Bloch vectors of this set make a circle around that of
|1〉. We can see by inspection that what gives the maxi-
mal value of the ratio |〈1˜|j〉|2/|〈0˜|j〉|2 lies within the z-x
plane.
Now, let us heuristically argue that the entanglement
attacks [12,13] do not work in the proposed scheme. Let
us consider the case where Alice prepares pairs of qubits
in an entangled state,
|ψ〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉A|0〉B + |1〉A|0¯〉B), (7)
where A and B denote Alice and Bob, respectively. Al-
ice sends qubits with label B to Bob while storing those
with label A. If she performs Sˆz, Bob is given a mixture
of |0〉 and |0¯〉 with equal frequency. Thus if Alice always
performs Sˆz, the attack reduces to a nonentanglement
attack where she randomly sends either |0〉 or |0¯〉. Let
us consider an example illustrating how performing mea-
surements much different from Sˆz is not of benefit for
Alice; we can rewrite Eq. (7) as
|ψ〉 =
√
2 +
√
2
2
|0¯〉A|α〉B +
√
2−√2
2
|1¯〉A|β〉B , (8)
where |α〉 and |β〉 are normalized ones of (|0〉+ |0¯〉) and
(|0〉 − |0¯〉), respectively. Thus if Alice performs Sˆx, ei-
ther |α〉 or |β〉 is generated at Bob’s site with probabil-
ities given by Eq. (8). However, since all of |〈1|α〉|2,
|〈1¯|α〉|2, |〈1|β〉|2, and |〈1¯|β〉|2 are of order of one, GA be-
comes much negative in any case. So Alice would not
perform Sˆx. In fact, if Alice is able to change the qubits
between |0〉 and |0¯〉 as she likes, her cheating will al-
ways be successful. However, she is not allowed to do so,
since |0〉〈0| 6= |0¯〉〈0¯| and Bob’s reduced density operator
ρB(= TrA[ρAB]) cannot be changed even with entangle-
ment attacks.
By appropriately choosing her measurement, Alice
can generate at Bob’s site any {pi, |i〉〈i|} satisfying∑
i pi|i〉〈i| = ρB, where {pi, |i〉〈i|} denotes a mixture
of pure states |i〉〈i| with relative frequency pi (the the-
orem of Houghston, Jozsa, and Wootters) [21]. Let
ρB = (1/2)(1+ rˆ · ~σ). Since ρB =
∑
i pi|i〉〈i| and |i〉〈i| =
(1/2)(1+ rˆi ·~σ) where rˆi is the corresponding Bloch vec-
tor, we have (1/2)(1+ rˆ ·~σ) = (1/2)(1+[∑i pirˆi] ·~σ) and
thus
rˆ =
∑
i
pirˆi. (9)
Therefore, for a given ρB whose Bloch vector is rˆ, Al-
ice can prepare at Bob’s site any mixture {pi, |i〉〈i|} as
long as its Bloch vectors rˆi satisfy the Eq. (9). How-
ever, if Alice always performs a given measurement, the
entanglement attacks reduce to the nonentanglement at-
tacks: outcomes of measurements on entangled pairs do
not depend on temporal order of the two participants’
measurements. So we can confine ourselves to the case
where Alice measures first. Then the attack reduces to
a nonentanglement attack where Alice generates |i〉 with
probability pi. Alice can only utilize the entanglement
by choosing her measurements according to Bob’s an-
nounced guesses. However, the checking steps also pre-
vent Alice from increasing her gain: she must choose the
measurement that gives some mixture {pi, |i〉〈i|} at Bob’s
site where each rˆi is nearly the same as either z or x. Oth-
erwise GA becomes dominated by a much negative term
involving rR. Therefore, Alice’s freedom in the choice of
measurements is negligible and thus she can increase her
3
gain by negligible amounts even with the entanglement
attacks.
Although the proposed scheme can be implemented
with currently available technologies, it is very sensitive
to errors. So before methods for reducing decoherence,
e.g., quantum error correcting codes [22] or decoherence-
free subspaces [23] are realized with high performance,
the proposed scheme seems to be impractical. And even
if such methods are available, errors will remain to be
generated with a small rate. Alice might insist that all
errors are the residual ones and would not give him the
R coins. Bob’s practical solution to this problem is that
he aborts the whole protocol if the error rate is greater
than the expected residual error rate, as suggested in the
original work [11]. Despite these difficulties, however,
it is worthwhile to have another application of the fun-
damental property that nonorthogonal qubits cannot be
distinguished with certainty [3–8].
In conclusion, we have given another (remote) quan-
tum gambling scheme that makes use of the fact that
nonorthogonal states cannot be distinguished with cer-
tainty. In the proposed scheme, two participants Alice
and Bob can be regarded as playing a game of making
guesses on identities of quantum states that are in one of
two given nonorthogonal states: if Bob makes a correct
(an incorrect) guess on the identity of a quantum state
that Alice has sent, he wins (loses). It was shown that
the proposed scheme is secure against the nonentangle-
ment attack. It could also be shown heuristically that the
scheme is secure in the case of the entanglement attack.
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